In this paper, inspired particularly by David Laidler's work in the field of monetary theory and policy, I shall compare the mistakes of monetary policy before and during the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s with the conduct of monetary policy in Japan since the late 1980s.
For the United States, my analysis will draw heavily on the contemporary 1930s writings of Lauchlin Currie (1902-93) whose biography I completed in 1990 (Sandilands 1990 ) which led to a fruitful correspondence with Laidler on Currie's monetary economics. This stemmed initially from his review article on Karl Brunner (Laidler 1991) . David was surprised to learn of Brunner's close connection with Currie and that he had written a lengthy introduction to the reissue of The Supply and (Currie 1934a (Currie [1968 ). It was this and several related papers, notably "The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929-32" (Currie 1934b) , 1 that induced Jacob Viner, then a special adviser at the US Treasury, to invite Currie to join a young Treasury group known as the "Freshman
Control of Money in the United States
Brain Trust" for the summer of 1934. Currie's remit was to develop the proposal for a 100 percent reserve banking system that he had made in his recent book, and devise what would be, in the absence of any political obstacle to its implementation, "the most perfect banking system for the United States".
100% money, as this scheme became known, was indeed a political non-starter, but its main logic -the need to gain firm control over bank reserves for effective control of the supply of money, hence the business cycle -was the inspiration for the 1935
Banking Act that was to establish a true central bank for the United States and shift the power base of the Federal Reserve System from New York to Washington. For at the Treasury Currie met Marriner Eccles who was soon to be the new governor of the Fed, taking Currie with him.
Currie's views on monetary and fiscal policy as the way out of depression had found little favour among the senior professors at Harvard, and when he applied for a further leave of absence at the Treasury (initially to be Viner's assistant) this was denied. So, somewhat embittered, he resigned from Harvard and his three month stint in Washington would extend to 11 years -at the Treasury, the Fed, and, from 1939-45, [He] was among the pioneers in our field in assembling and assessing data on the money stock. He fully appreciated that meaningful analysis cannot proceed in the absence of reliable data. This pioneering work eventually forced the Federal Reserve Authorities to develop suitable monetary data on a broader scale, and particularly collect and publish data bearing on the nation's money stock.
He added (p.xxiv):
Currie's systematic discussion of policy issues considers also some notions often repeated by the Federal Reserve authorities… Many believed that the Federal
Reserve had tried to stem the deflationary tide of the preceding years by means of an expansionary policy. The experience was interpreted as a demonstration that monetary policy was useless… Currie shows that this belief is a myth… The examination reveals not inability to exert influence but a persistent inactivity and drift. Open market policy and acceptance policy were not used to raise the monetary base. His analysis shows that the Federal Reserve authorities could have effectively prevented the collapse in the monetary stock during the Great Depression.
In this paper I explore some intriguing parallels between Currie's analysis of Fed policy in the turbulent years after the 1929 Wall Street crash and recent debates on Bank of Japan policy during the protracted 'growth stagnation' period that followed Japan's asset market crashes of 1990-91. In particular, controversy focuses on (i) how far central bank policy should be influenced by asset price inflation; (ii) the appropriate role of the central bank as lender of last resort to the commercial banking system in the face of mass liquidation of debts and non-performing assets; (iii) the criteria for judging whether monetary policy has been active or acquiescent; (iv) the alleged impotence of monetary policy and whether there exists a Keynesian 'liquidity trap' or whether instead the problem has been more like a Hawtreyan 'credit deadlock'; (v) the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy in recovery from severe deflation; and (vi) the significance of a build-up of excess bank reserves.
I turn first to Currie's diagnosis of the causes of the Great Depression, drawing partly on Sandilands (2004) .
Federal Reserve policy, 1927-41, and Hawtrey's concept of "credit deadlock" in a monetary theory of the cycle
As Thomas Humphrey (1971) , Laidler (1993 Laidler ( , 1999 , and Frank Steindl (1995) have explained, Currie's publications in the early 1930s presented a diagnosis of the 1929-32 collapse in the United States economy that was substantially the same as that advanced by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , as Friedman has since acknowledged (see his mea culpa in Laidler, 1993 Laidler, , p.1077 ).
In his "restatement" of the quantity theory of money, Friedman (1956) had contended that there was a unique Chicago oral tradition that made Chicago relatively immune to the Keynesian "virus", and that his own restatement was in that Chicago tradition.
This sparked heated debate on the nature of that tradition: whether it was unique, and whether Friedman's restatement was closer to that tradition or to the "Cambridge" tradition of Marshall, Pigou and Keynes (especially the pre-General Theory Keynes),
as Patinkin (1969 Patinkin ( , 1981 maintained.
Evidence relevant to this was later found in a January 1932 Harvard memorandum on anti-depression policy written by Currie, Paul Theodore Ellsworth, and Harry Dexter White (2002 [1932] ). On seeing this document Friedman again retreated (in a letter reproduced in Laidler and Sandilands, 2002, p.518) In this the memorandum was close to the position taken at that time by Hawtrey (1929 Hawtrey ( , 1931 whose assistant Currie had been during Hawtrey's year at Harvard in 1928-29, and close also to the position said by Friedman to be characteristic of a unique Chicago tradition. For example, the memorandum stated: "Our banking policy
has not exerted any effective influence to check the decline in the means of payment.
Instead of offsetting the decline in the demand for goods caused by the decreased rate of spending, our policy has intensified it by permitting a contraction of the volume of the means of payment." By 1931 the deflationary forces had gone too far to be reversed through purely monetary actions:
With confidence as badly shaken as it is at present, and with prices continuing to fall, there is little in the current outlook to make it attractive to business men to borrow in amounts sufficient to stimulate recovery… Since the initiation of a voluntary program of expansion by independent, scattered producers must wait upon the appearance of the prospect of profits, and since the Federal Government is the sole agency in a central position and strong enough to undertake drastic remedial action, it is strongly recommended that the government immediately commence a program of public construction on a nationwide scale… This program should be financed, not by taxation, which serves principally to divert expenditures from one channel to another, but by an issue of bonds… eligible for rediscount at the Federal Reserve Banks, and also as collateral for the issue of Federal Reserve notes (Currie, Ellsworth and White, 2002 [1932] , p.540). 1934a and 1934b, pp.146-48) . In other words, for its failure to use fully its lender-of-lastresort responsibilities at a time of crisis.
A popular view is that a 'speculative orgy' on Wall Street was the prime cause of the great depression. According to the commercial loan theory, security loans diverted credit from more productive uses, thereby denying the 'legitimate needs of industry'.
Currie disputed this claim. First, he found that interest rates were only weakly related to stock market activity but strongly related to restrictive Fed policies, and in 1929 these were more severe than any since 1921, made worse for being applied when recession was already under way. Second, banks' security loans were only a small proportion of all security loans. The majority were effected via brokers in the stock market clearing house, thus requiring little net use of bank deposits. And an examination of individual stock prices revealed a considerable degree of rational selectivity (rather than 'irrational exuberance') based on the differing earnings record and potentials.
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In his 1931 thesis, and in line with his criticism of the commercial loan theory, Currie endorsed, with qualifications, Hawtrey's monetary theory of the business cycle.
Hawtrey stressed the 'inherent instability of credit', 5 due to the sensitivity of 4 Currie's views on stock prices in 1929 find confirmation in Santoni (1987) . For further discussion of his views on the (relatively minor) impact of stock market prices on the circular flow of income via the wealth effect on savings, see Sandilands (1990, pp.35-37) . 5 Hawtrey defined 'credit' as demand deposits. In the 1932 version of his PhD thesis, Currie deleted almost all reference to this word on the grounds that the term was too ambiguous. Currie's chapter IV, "Credit in Contemporary Monetary Theory" (also Currie 1933) , explains the problem. Banks can extend 'credit' (loans and investments) on the basis of both demand and savings deposit liabilities, and from borrowings from reserve banks when the public's demand for currency increases. And in 1928-29 the Federal Reserve Board included security loans made by non-banks, as would be logical if by credit is understood loans and investments and if this is the control target (Currie 1934b, p.49) . This 'credit' series can increase at very different rates than the supply of money (currency plus demand deposits). Regarding 1927-29, he wrote: "The belief that 'credit' was expanding rapidly was based on figures for loans and investments. The index of the entire money supply… indicates that the rate of expansion was less than that of production and the rate of expansion was declining steadily from June, 1925 " (Currie 1934a . For unknown reasons much of Currie's discussion of Hawtrey's cycle theory was deleted from the 1932 version of his thesis in favour of further allusions to Keynes's 1930 Treatise on wholesalers and merchants (more than manufacturers) to changes in the short-term rate of interest. The rate naturally falls in a depression when demand for commercial loans is low, and vice versa in the upswing. With a fall in demand for loans there is a fall in output, incomes and expenditures (effective demand) until declining interest rates arrest and then reverse the fall in loan demand. In the upswing, rising incomes increase the public's demand for cash. This squeezes the banks' reserves and interest rates rise. Eventually this arrests and then reverses the upswing -in the absence of astute counter-cyclical policy by the central bank.
Currie offered several criticisms of Hawtrey's monetary theory but stressed that none was fatal. In particular, he argued that banks are able and willing to expand and contract their holdings of (relatively marketable, hence liquid) securities, stocks and bonds to compensate for opposite movements in the demand for (relatively illiquid) short-term commercial loans. Furthermore, this ability to vary their asset holdings (hence their deposit liabilities) is a more important counter-cyclical influence than variations in the short-term interest rate. For the demand for commercial loans is lowest when demand for goods is lowest, and in those circumstances a lowering of short-term rates will not compensate. Earlier in his thesis, Currie wrote:
If business men were as sensitive to short-term interest rate changes as Mr.
Hawtrey seems to believe, commercial loans could be easily expanded by a fall in rates and contracted by a rise. A contrary view, however, which corresponds more closely to reality, is that the cost of short-term borrowing is not an important consideration in the calculation of borrowers. Of much more importance is the actual and anticipated demand for goods. If business conditions are receding, a fall in the short-term interest rates will not induce manufacturers and traders voluntarily to accumulate inventory. It is precisely at such a time that they are most eager to reduce inventories. This is one of the reasons why the movement of interest rates and commercial borrowings have a direct rather than an inverse relation to one another (Currie 1931, p.86 [I]f the depression is very severe, enterprise will be killed. It is possible that no rate of interest, however low, will tempt dealers to buy goods. Even lending money without interest would not help if the borrower anticipated a loss on every conceivable use that he could make of the money. In that case the purchase of securities by the Central Bank, which is otherwise no more than a useful reinforcement of the low Bank rate, hastening the progress of revival, becomes an essential condition of the revival beginning at all. By buying securities the Central Bank creates money, which appears in the form of deposits credited to the banks variations in the rate of interest influence the extent of their operations, providing their competitors pay the same. It is the "market" on which they count. Likewise, cf. Currie (1931, p.214) on Hawtrey: "It has not been difficult for his critics to show that traders are more influenced by the state of the market than by interest rates." 7 This is one reason why Currie favoured nationwide branch banking and opposed the provision in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that prohibited commercial banks from dealing in corporate securities. 8 Not to be confused with a Keynesian 'liquidity trap', discussed below, in which the demand for money is supposed to be highly elastic with respect to the long-term rate of interest. whose customers have sold the securities. The banks can thus be flooded with idle money, and given a new and powerful inducement to find additional borrowers Hawtrey, 1931, pp.30-31) .
Elsewhere, Hawtrey goes further and -consistent with Currie, Ellsworth and White (1932 [2002] ) above -argues that fiscal deficits arising from public works can be an effective supplementary measure to revive a deeply depressed economy, but only if the deficit is financed by money creation, for otherwise private sector spending would usually be crowded out (the famous 1929 "Treasury View" that originated with Hawtrey). When deficits were financed by money creation, it was this money, and not any direct expenditure associated with fiscal policy, that would do the work (Laidler and Sandilands, 2002, p.524) . Later, we shall return to this argument in the context of recent Japanese macroeconomic policy.
Here is Hawtrey on the 'credit deadlock' in Currency and Credit (1950 edition, p.75) 9 :
When the vicious circle of depression takes hold, and traders find their efforts to keep down their stocks defeated by too rapid decline in sales, the relaxation of credit may find them so burdened with unsold goods that no facility of borrowing can induce them to add to their stocks. A deadlock results, productive activity failing to respond to cheap money… If the banks fail to stimulate short-term borrowing, they can create credit by themselves buying securities in the investment market. The market will seek to use the resources thus placed in it, and it will become more favourable to new 9 Laidler (2004b, p.12) noted that by 1932 Hawtrey could not fail to see that a lowering of the short-term interest rate would need to be supplemented by open market bond purchases. Hawtrey (1932, p.173) wrote that these should be on whatever scale was necessary to break a credit deadlock and the vicious circle of deflation, for "there must ultimately be a limit to the amount of money that sellers would hold idle". It is noteworthy that even at this late date Hawtrey did not stress fiscal deficits as an essential policy ingredient for expanding the monetary circulation (unlike Currie, Ellsworth and White [1932] ). He seems to have regarded fiscal deficits as useful but inessential in breaking a deadlock. Patrick Deutscher (1990, p.67) noted that Hawtrey "never renounced the position that eventually profitable opportunities would be found and exploited by capitalists as long as credit remained accommodating". He also (p.68) quotes Hawtrey as writing that "People do not have an unlimited desire to hold idle balances. Because they already hold more than usual, it does not follow that they are willing to hold still more." Further expansion of money "is bound ultimately to reach a point at which demand responds". However, Hawtrey did not stress that this may take much longer than if the money is spent directly into circulation by government. banks promote a strong bond market this might not only improve business sentiment but "would at least furnish those public authorities who are in favor of an expansion of public works with an additional argument. In so far as the policy of expanding public works in times of depression is adopted, and banks purchase bonds of public authorities, the additional bank credit will be spent directly and will not involve any decrease in the spending ability of private individuals" (p.236).
However, the supply of high-grade bonds (including those issued by public authorities and foreign borrowers) may be inadequate (in the absence of substantial bondfinanced public works) to meet the requirement of banks; and if their purchases of old bonds "do not stimulate new issues the long-term interest rate may decline to a point at which banks may, perhaps, prefer to maintain excess reserves rather than risk a future loss from depreciation when interest rates rise" (p.216). This was probably written in 1930 before a credit deadlock had fully taken hold, and he noted then that while this consideration does not seem to have deterred banks in the past -hence "the objection to the monetary theory of the business cycle which rests on the inability of the banking system to take the initiative in expanding credit, is by no means conclusive" (p.218) -it may conceivably do so in the future.
Actually Currie (1934b, p.115) Bond prices fell drastically, followed by bank failures, increased hoarding of notes, more liquidation, more failures, more hoarding, and a severe contraction of money.
On the importance of timing, Currie (1934b, p.146) wrote:
If action is taken before the upswing in business has reached its peak a comparatively mild easing policy will be sufficient to stimulate investment [in the subsequent downswing]. If, on the other hand, action is delayed until business has acquired a considerable momentum on the downswing a drastic expansion of money is called for. If the depression has become so severe as to entail a widespread loss of confidence in the solvency of both corporations and banks it 12 As Laidler (2003a, p.10) expressed it: a credit deadlock prevents money being created, whereas in a liquidity trap money lies idle after it has been created. See also Laidler (1999, p.286) . 13 Laidler (1999, p.236 ) noted that Currie implicitly denied there was a liquidity trap, in the sense of the powerlessness of monetary policy per se, even up to 1932. The reserve banks did buy an unprecedented amount of bonds, but not enough to get banks out of debt and to offset gold outflows; and because reserves did not increase he characterised the reserve administration's policy as "one of almost complete passivity and acquiescence". (A fuller quotation is given below.) may be impossible to bring about immediate utilization of any excess reserves given to member banks.
For the sake of straight thinking on the subject of control it is essential to interpret it in terms of the changing industrial situation. He continued:
Much of the current belief in the powerlessness of the reserve banks appears to arise from a complete misreading of the monetary history of 1929-32. It is generally held that the reserve administration strove energetically to bring about expansion throughout the depression but that contraction continued despite its efforts. Actually the reserve administration's policy was one of almost complete passivity and quiescence (ibid, p.147).
On the excess reserves question, Hawtrey (1950, p.84 ) also wrote that "much depends on the magnitude of the idle balances. If they are too considerable to be offset by increased advances to traders, the banks may create credit by purchase of securities.
But they must buy at prices which investors are beginning to find unattractive, and by buying will force prices higher still." At this point he alluded to Keynes's General Theory in which, by thus driving down the long-term rate of interest, "an increased absorption of cash will then result" from the risk of capital depreciation when the long rate has reached its conventional minimum. Hawtrey acknowledged (1950, p.85) :
When this minimum is reached, the market's stimulus is exhausted. Even the banks will require a minimum yield; they are no more ready than others to tie up their money without any compensation. Currie's second (but still not fatal) criticism of Hawtrey's cycle theory was that he placed too much stress on the supply of bank deposits and too little on movements into and out of cash, as well as on short-term variations in the "circuit velocity" of deposits and cash (purchasing power). 14 Nonetheless fluctuations in the supply of purchasing power, and also in its secular trend, do exercise a profound influence on the business cycle. And if this be true then "it follows that the mechanism by which the volume of credit is expanded and contracted is also of significance" (1931, p.222).
Currie goes on to state that "the study of credit movements in the business cycle involves an explanation of two problems: first, the forces affecting the reserves of member and non-member banks, second, the means by which banks are enabled to 14 However, Hawtrey (1925) , reprinted in Hawtrey (1928) to which Currie's 1931 thesis refers, acknowledged that government spending may, in a depression, be financed by borrowing from balances that lie idle, and that this could increase "the ratio of consumers' income to the unspent margin" (i.e., money). This is another way of saying that the velocity of circulation must increase if public works are to increase employment in the absence of extra money.
adjust their deposits to their reserves" (ibid.). The latter problem is the focus of Currie's PhD thesis on the links between the business cycle and the supply and control of various classes of bank asset. The former was more the focus of his 1934 book on the control of the supply of money. There he examined the different reserves (legally required and otherwise) held by different classes of bank and different type of deposit during the various stages of the business cycle, and the often perverse or procyclical elasticity of the money supply that had resulted from that bank structure.
In the concluding chapter of his 1931 thesis Currie referred to conditions in 1930 and complained that "[a]s long as the demand for commercial loans continues to decline the Board apparently sees no necessity of permitting the expansion of credit to take place" (pp.243-44). This was a recipe for pro-cyclical monetary policy that was to deepen the on-going depression. The Fed was too preoccupied with the composition and perceived relative productivity of bank assets, to the neglect of its primary function, that of controlling the overall volume of bank deposits:
It is evident that the commercial loan theory of banking is incompatible with the view that the chief function of the banking system is to supply purchasing power,
and that a central bank should control this supply in the interests not only of commercial borrowers, but of the community in general (p.242).
Finally, he advanced a number of recommendations for amending the Federal Reserve Act, especially in respect of the question of bank assets eligible for rediscount (p.248), and of the need to relax the gold reserve requirement against notes. After he had teamed up with Marriner Eccles in 1934, he was to effect some of these measures, designed to convert a 'perversely elastic' banking system into an effective 'maladjustment-compensating factor'.
Allan Meltzer (2003, pp.478-79) published"… The reason he gave was that money (deposits) depend on member bank borrowing, and there was no borrowing. This is an odd conclusion.
The puzzle is resolved by recognising the key conditions that make for effectiveness of monetary policy in the different phases of slump and recovery. To effect recovery from a slump, the Fed must first get member banks out of debt. This the Fed had failed to accomplish adequately in 1929-32. The policy of passive acquiescence to banks' loss of deposits resulted in mass liquidations and a downward spiral into
depression. An acute Hawtreyan credit deadlock then meant that banks could not find enough credit-worthy customers when eventually they were able to lend again, and so they accumulated substantial excess reserves. In such conditions monetary policy alone is, in the famous words of Marriner Eccles, like pushing on a string.
Currie believed that the deadlock required not only vigorous open market operations but also an active fiscal policy to spend new and old money into circulation, just as he, Ellsworth and White emphasised in their January 1932 Harvard memorandum.
Hawtrey was more lukewarm than Currie on the need for government expenditure and fiscal deficits as a way out of depression, though he did not deny their potential effectiveness. As noted above, Hawtrey (1925 Hawtrey ( , in 1928 However, while "the banks created credit by taking a considerable part of the securities issued by the Government to meet the deficit", he noted that the growth of money national income was slower than the growth of bank deposits. Thus the policy of "lavish public expenditure [that] came to be called 'priming the pump'" had disappointing results, and "when the banking system has to be unceasingly inundated year after year, the analogy wears rather thin" (p.411). 16 Hawtrey noted that revival in Britain was achieved with no recourse to public works or budget deficits as an expedient for inducing a monetary expansion until 1937 when borrowing for rearmament started (just at the time of the unhelpful United States recession). He seemed to hint that the United States should have been able to achieve the same results without the government expenditures that "had been incurred in vain".
Fiscal deficits, excess reserves and the recession of 1937-38
16 See Sandilands (1990, pp.68-74 ) on Currie's various descriptions of the government's contribution to spending. He early abandoned the pump-priming analogy because it suggested that one short dose of government spending would be sufficient to revive the economic machine without further help. Depending on how private-sector offsets to saving were moving, he recognized that the government might have to keep pumping for some time. Sweezy (1971, p.118 ) described Currie's 'net Federal income-creating expenditure' label as "a semantic triumph of the first magnitude. It brought out the common element in all the government's fiscal operations. No one used to thinking in terms of the net contribution could advocate promoting recovery by increasing public works spending while at the same time cutting government salaries and raising tax rates". See also Currie's early 1935 memorandum, "Comments on pump priming", published in Currie (1978) . On a Keynesian interpretation of the downturn in 1937-38, this fiscal reversal was a crucial causal factor. By comparison, variations in the degree of excess liquidity in the banks were of secondary importance. By cutting the federal deficit there was a fall in the supply of safe earning assets that the banks had previously relied on. They could not easily or quickly replace them with a corresponding increase in private sector lending, for the decline in government spending and the increase in tax and social security receipts were themselves depressing demand for private sector output. This naturally restrained private loan demand. These factors, rather than the raising of reserve requirements, may account for the diminution of demand deposits from mid-1937 and the continued high level of excess reserves.
Telser (2001) It seems reasonable to assume that the desire to take profits was the major motivating factor in bank sales of Government bonds, particularly since sales were engaged in by so many banks that possessed more than adequate reserves to meet the new requirements. Moreover, had the purpose been merely to obtain reserves, banks could have reduced their holdings of short-term Government paper instead of liquidating long-term bonds.
If banks had continued to buy bonds on secondary markets this would have increased the riskiness of their asset portfolio by further depressing interest rates. If they had maintained their assets by making more fresh loans to the private sector in place of loans to government, this would also have increased their risk, absent a strong increase in loan demand by credit-worthy customers. In other words, the economy still had not broken out of a state of credit deadlock, or self-sustaining growth, and was still dependent on direct injections of monetary expenditures by the public sector.
There was some increase in private sector loans throughout 1937 but insufficient to compensate for the public sector's decreased demand, especially as private profit prospects were dented by the decline in the government's "net contribution". Thus if the Fed had not raised reserve requirements there would probably have been further accumulations of excess reserves.
Nonetheless, the increased reserve requirements under these conditions could not have helped matters, and must partly explain why banks sold bonds to maintain their liquidity. Again, however, Currie gave greater weight, in his May 1938 Illinois address, to banks' desire to avoid capital-value losses at the end of the bond market's bull run, with the decline "initiated by municipal and Federal bonds in January [1937] before action with reference to excess reserves was announced." 19 He insisted that action on reserves would not have worsened the recession whose causes lay elsewhere -in the smaller deficit plus other non-monetary factors, notably the exceptional inventory accumulations in late1936 that would be worked off a few months later. Steindl (2004, p.66) has written that in his analysis of recovery Currie had abandoned the quantity-theoretic analysis that he had applied to the contraction of 1929-33: "He therefore did not see the recovery as the product of an increasing stock of money. For him, the quantity of money was now an endogenous variable, subject to the needs of business as it sought to borrow, thereby affecting deposits, money, and excess reserves." The quantity theory's identity (MV = Py) states that if velocity is constant then the value of national income (Py) will increase in line with M. But in the unusual conditions of the mid-1930s Currie feared that both velocity and money would be excessively pro-cyclical as and when a firm recovery was assured, since business and consumers would then be able and willing to draw down their substantial idle balances. 20 Steindl's belief that he showed little interest in the money supply after 19 This part of his Illinois speech was taken from a memorandum, "Causes of the Recession", April 1, 1938, later published in Currie (1980 Currie ( [1938 , p.327). There he denied that monetary policy in 1936 or the rise in reserve requirements in January 1937 could "be held responsible either as an initiating or contributory factor in the recession. As events turned out it would have been perfectly safe to have postponed the rise in reserve requirements that occurred in March and May of 1937. This however, was not evident in January of 1937 and is an entirely different matter" (ibid., pp.328-29). 20 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.774) Lash, 1988, pp.317-27) . The New York Post reported the next day that "the four advisers minced no words in giving Roosevelt a hardboiled review of economic conditions and with equal bluntness and vigor they told him that a disastrous recession can only be averted by a resumption of big-scale Government spending." The group laid a report before the president that showed that "in August, for the first time since 1931, the government took more out of the income stream than it poured back in… If the Government takes taxes away from workers or corporations and uses these in bookkeeping items, such as old age reserve accounts, gold purchases, debt retirement, etc., and the amount exceeds what is paid for men and materials, then there is a deficit. That is what is happening now."
In a speech to Congress a few days after his "Keynesian" seminar, Roosevelt asked:
"What does the country ultimately gain if we encourage businessmen to enlarge the capacity of American industry to produce unless we see to it that the income of our working population actually expands sufficiently to create markets to absorb the increased production." But in practice Roosevelt initially sided with Secretary Morgenthau's call for a balanced budget "to restore confidence". Disaster followed.
Not until April 14, 1938, after the worst period of his long tenure in the White House and after a strong letter from Keynes in February, did Roosevelt at last ask Congress (over the continuing objections of the Secretary of the Treasury) for more than $3 billion of spending or lending in the immediate future for relief, public works, housing and assistance to state and local governments (see Barber 1996, p.114; also Black 2003, pp.428-36) . Economic recovery resumed.
The lasting legacy of the theoretical, empirical, and practical experience of the depression and war years was the February 1946 Employment Act. Its passage through Congress was stormy, and the original bill was much watered down.
Nevertheless, a statute that affirmed governmental responsibility for "maximum employment, production and purchasing power" was a significant advance over the more limited mandate for government that, for example, was preferred by Irving
Fisher and the Chicago School with their rules-based price stability goal for monetary policy and with fiscal policy aimed at low-level balanced budgets. The war itself accustomed people to higher and more progressive rates of taxation and government spending, and these were only partially retrenched in peacetime. This introduced a much greater degree of built-in stability by effectively increasing the marginal savings rate at the full employment level of income and expenditure.
Postwar prosperity and the Japanese experience
To the extent that these automatic stabilizers mitigate the business cycle and make are included), with four years in which growth was negative (see Table 1 ). This Werner concludes that the BoJ bears responsibility for encouraging banks to lend recklessly on speculative real estate ventures, or to non-bank financial intermediaries who would then also channel funds to property speculators. He deemed most of these 'unproductive', with more than a hint of the real bills doctrine underlying his critique of central bank policy (Werner, p.230) . He favoured selective credit controls, but ones directed to 'productive' investment activities, believing these to be the only credits that promote real, non-inflationary growth. However, in this case there is strong evidence that the window guidance did indeed distort the allocation of funds and caused inflated asset prices to deviate from fundamentals to a far greater degree than was true of the United States in the 1920s or 1980s. 24 Although the BoJ was not granted formal independence from the Ministry of Finance until 1998, Werner (p.293) emphasised that, acting secretively through its Banking Department, the BoJ possessed a high degree of de facto independence over credit creation:
The problem was not that bank lending was out of control. To the contrary, it was controlled almost perfectly by the Bank of Japan's window guidance. Instead, the problem was the policy taken by the Bank of Japan in setting loan growth quotas.
Since the Bank of Japan chose far larger quotas than banks thought necessary, compliance with window guidance meant that banks were forced to peddle their loans to real estate speculators… thus pushing up real estate prices (ibid., p.292).
Real estate values were then used as collateral for further loans, which meant further purchases and sales, with sellers redepositing the proceeds. These would then be recycled as yet more new loans. Werner (p.184) notes that there was "a remarkable surge in financial and real estate transactions during the second half of the 1980s".
Thus the money supply did not have to increase rapidly for asset prices to soar while consumer prices were quite steady. The transactions velocity of money (sometimes referred to as money's 'financial circuit velocity') is notoriously volatile. In the late 1980s it was obviously spiralling while the more important and economically meaningful income velocity (demand for money as a proportion of GDP) remained fairly stable. Thus, just as Currie claimed for the US in the 1920s there is no strong evidence that stock market and real estate transactions were diverting money or credit from the circular flow of current GDP in Japan. From 1985-91, Table 1 shows that the BoJ's preferred definition of money (M2 + CDs, which includes relatively lowturnover time deposits) rose by an average annual rate of 8.6 percent. On the M1 definition (currency plus demand deposits) the average growth was just 6.1 percent, consistent with a low inflation rate of 1.7 percent and real GDP growth of 4.6 percent, hence a constant and broadly satisfied demand for money.
United States in the 1990s-2000s. He shows that in the 1980s boom, Japan's monetary growth was faster than in either of the two US booms. And after the stock market's peak, "money fell sharply in the first episode and so did nominal GDP; money growth stagnated in the second episode [Japan] and so did GDP; money grew at a rapid rate in the third episode and, after a brief lag… so did GDP" (pp.147-48). In any event, good times not bad would be the appropriate time to fix problems of poor debt management and inefficient banking structure -which may have been endemic for a long period, in good times and bad, hence not obviously the main cause of recession. As it was, shortly after the asset bubbles burst, growth declined -to 1.0 percent in 1992 and 0.3 percent in 1993. The economy continued to stagnate for the next 12 years. The bursting of the bubbles was a major shock to business and consumer confidence that naturally led to determined attempts to restore battered wealth holdings and provision for pensions.
Interest rates and the money supply
What were the macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) policy responses? Table 1 reveals the monetary response. In the critical year of 1992, the money supply (M1) grew by just 1.9 percent. The broader measure (M2 + CDs) actually fell by 0.4 percent. At the same time, interest rates on time and savings deposits were falling sharply. The fall in these deposit rates may well reflect not loose monetary policy but rather the way the wealth shock would have induced corporations and individuals both to try to replenish their wealth and to reduce their demand for loanable funds for investment in a depressed economy. 25 No doubt reflecting an excess supply of savings (loanable funds) relative to investment, short and long lending rates were also falling sharply. The excess savings were also reflected in a strong balance of payments on current account and rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 26 Presumably, much of this reserve accumulation was being sterilised, for it is not reflected in the money supply figures.
Over the next few years interest rates were to fall further. The rate on the more liquid savings deposits fell to a mere 0.25 percent by 1994 and then to close to zero, below which they cannot fall unless some sort of 'Gesell tax' on money balances were imposed to overcome the 'zero lower bound' problem (as suggested by Mitsuhiro Fukao, 2004 ). This appears to have had a very strong effect on the composition of money and 'quasi-money' balances. Currency plus demand deposits (M1) rose by an average of 7.6 percent a year over the whole period 1992-2005 while the broader (M2 plus CDs) series rose by only 2.2 percent. With the return on savings deposits falling to almost the same as on demand deposits, the percentage of the latter to the former more than doubled -from 25.9 percent in 1992 to 54.5 percent in 2005 (see Table 1 ).
The shifting of low-turnover savings deposits into demand deposits has meant that the growth of M1 is misleading. The broader (M2 + CDs) series, with its much slower growth, better reflects the tight monetary conditions that prevailed from 1992 until recently. 27 The velocity of M1 declined over the period by about 7 percent a year -as measured by the difference between growth of M1 and growth of nominal GDP. By contrast, the decline in the velocity of the broader (M2 + CDs) series was more modest at about 2 percent a year.
25 Laidler (e.g., 2004a Laidler (e.g., , 2006 has lamented the modern focus on short-term interest rates as the central bank's most potent policy weapon and as the criterion of monetary looseness or tightness, to the relative neglect of the traditional focus on monetary aggregates. 26 Bank of Japan (2005), pp.69-70. The foreign reserves rose by 2.7 percent in 1992, to $70 billion, but thereafter they climbed rapidly -to $101 billion in 1993 and then to $844 billion by mid-2005. 27 M2 exclusive of CDs grew slightly less fast than the (M2 + CDs) series since CDs, with their higher interest rate, naturally increased more than time deposits.
In view of the rise in the demand for money as nominal interest rates declined, it would appear that the BoJ's response to asset price deflation and economic recession in late 1991 and into 1992 and beyond should have been more vigorously to offset the deflationary effect of a rise in the demand for money to hold and the related fall in the demand for money to spend (that is, demand for loans). Instead, it presided over a sharp fall in the growth of money that was partly the result of a fall in the demand for loanable funds which in turn inhibits expansion of money via new bank credits.
Recall that the characteristic of a Hawtreyan credit deadlock is that it prevents money being created, whereas a Keynesian liquidity trap suggests that even if money is created this would do no good by itself. But with interest rates falling to very low levels, many observers have concluded that the economy had fallen into a liquidity trap. For example, Paul Krugman (1999, p.2) argued that if, as was happening in Japan, "the interest rate is zero, bonds and money become in effect equivalent assets; so conventional monetary policy, in which money is swapped for bonds via openmarket operation, changes nothing"; and "once it became clear that the Bank of Japan really did consider itself unable to increase demand in an economy that badly needed it, it also became clear… that the theory of the liquidity trap needed a fresh, hard look". He stressed that this trap "is in a fundamental sense an expectational issue.
Monetary expansion is irrelevant [to effective demand] because the private sector does not expect it to be sustained". (2006) alludes to his well-known views on the way that an alleged "ever-rising yen syndrome" and international capital mobility drove Japanese interest rates to zero in order to satisfy the interest-parity condition when US rates were falling to around 3 percent in the early 1990s. When after 1995 the yen ceased its secular tendency to appreciate, he argues that zero interest rates must now reflect a negative risk premium on Japan's vast holdings of dollar assets. He does not consider whether Japan's strong currency was a reflection of its tight monetary policy. It seems safe to conclude that much of the fiscal effort was ineffective -even wasted:
the quality of a large part of the public works has been criticised as little better than leaf-raking or pyramid-building (in contrast to the productivity of United States infrastructure projects in the 1930s, as highlighted by Alexander Field [2003] ). For 30 Not "sound money and plenty of it" (which Laidler [2004a. p.334] referred to as the "Purvis principle" in the context of inflation control), but "cheap money and plenty of it" perhaps better reflects their advice for countering recession, or even "dear money but plenty of it", if the consequence of vigorous monetary expansion would have been to avoid recession and thereby prevent the nominal interest rate from falling pro-cyclically. See also footnote 12 above.
Keynes, useless pyramids were better than nothing for they could revive the economy through their indirect multiplier effects. But absent an expansion of money the multiplier effect would have to come entirely through an increase in the velocity of circulation. In the case of Japan we have, on the contrary, seen velocity declining.
The deficit increased each year since 1992 by an average of about 6 percent of GDP.
Since this was much greater than the average increase in the money supply, it is clear that the bulk of the deficits was financed not through the printing press (borrowing from the central bank), but by selling bonds to commercial banks and, mainly, to the non-bank private sector, especially major institutions such as large insurance companies, pension funds, and Japan Post. 31 In this way the government was absorbing a very large portion of the increase in savings over the period. To the extent that the propensity to save was increasing faster than the private sector was willing to borrow or the banks to lend, the increase in relatively risk-free government bills or bonds can at least be credited with having prevented a Great Depression of 1930s
proportions. But because the deficits apparently did no more than that and/or actually crowded out some bank lending to the private sector (either because the banks had too few excess reserves or because they may have lowered their risk threshold had there been fewer opportunities to lend to the government), they failed to prevent a Great Stagnation. Some deficit spending (but much less than its actual extent) may have been a necessary condition for recovery, but evidently not a sufficient condition. Werner (2005, ch.18) argues that fiscal policy is ineffective if it is not monetised.
There was a notorious absence of cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and commercial banks, however, also assumes they always had sufficient spare reserves with which to make loans to government without diverting funds from the private sector. It is true that during the recent period of 'quantitative easing' the BoJ had been flooding the banking system with excess reserves, but this was signally not the case in the 1990s. 32 In this respect conditions were less propitious for stimulating the economy via fiscal deficits than in the United States after 1933 when the banks had significant excess reserves. And in any case it does not explain why Japanese banks
were not more active in bidding for the bonds that were offered on the markets.
Without fully addressing this question, Werner (2005, p.255) nevertheless insists that "the institutional reality of banking systems [including credit-rationing] allows banks to create purchasing power without withdrawing existing purchasing power from other parts of the economy"; and "fiscal expenditure by borrowing from banks would increase credit creation and hence the total amount of purchasing power in the economy". He continues:
By shifting government funding away from bond finance and replacing it with borrowing from the commercial banks via simple loan contracts, credit creation will be stimulated. Unlike bond markets, banks create new purchasing power when they lend. This means that overall economic activity can be boosted (via fiscal policy), without any quantity crowding-out that rendered fiscal policy ineffective during the 1990s. Banks, though risk-averse due to their bad debts, would not mind lending to the government -a zero-risk borrower.
Werner claims (p.364) that if the banks had run up against a reserve constraint, the BoJ "would be forced to inject any necessary amount of liquidity in order to maintain its targeted call rate". But it is not at all clear that the BoJ did have a target call rate in the 1990s, except insofar as it was in continuous decline. That, in essence, appears to have been the problem: the BoJ was unwilling to monetise the deficit by providing the finance itself, but nor did it provide the commercial banks with the reserves they would have needed for that purpose. However, the latter, indirect method of monetising the deficit would need to have been at the initiative of the banks; and their potential bond purchases would have faced stiff competition from the non-bank financial intermediaries whose huge savings deposit liabilities were already sufficient for them to finance fiscal deficits in a non-inflationary -hence non-stimulatory -way.
Ben Bernanke (2003) argues that greater cooperation between the BoJ and the Treasury, with greater BoJ purchases of government debt, could also mitigate the effect of deficits on the debt burden and future interest payments perceived by households, and so reduce any 'Ricardian equivalence' effect on their propensity to save. Another option would have been for the BoJ more comprehensively to have bought up the banks' non-performing loans. As noted above, Werner persuasively argues that these were created at least as much because of incompetent BoJ policy as because of irresponsible commercial banking policy. He thus dismisses "moral hazard" arguments against central bank purchases of bad debts, and instead urges this as an effective way to increase the money supply.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our brief survey of economic conditions in Japan after the bursting of asset bubbles in the early 1990s indicates that Japan's Great Stagnation could probably have been avoided if a much more active monetary policy had been pursued after 1991. A very active fiscal policy was tried and found wanting. This suggests that Japan's problem was not that she was in a conventional Keynesian liquidity trap that could be escaped via the activation of idle balances with little increase in the money supply. But compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the authorities at least ensured that there was no contraction of the money supply, hence no actual collapse of the economy into another Great Depression; and fiscal policy may have helped.
In any case, the last word (in fact, many words) should go to David Laidler, who pointed out that when at last the BoJ engaged in a dramatically different, ultra-loose quantitative easing policy, instead of relying solely on a near-zero discount rate as a criterion of "easing", prices and output at last began to show signs of recovery. He suggests (Laidler 2003b, p.130 ) that a model that puts the interaction of the supply and demand for money at the centre of things is much more informative about monetary policy's transmission mechanism than focus on the interest rate alone:
Consider, for example, the currently conventional wisdom about…the zero lower bound problem. It might happen, and indeed in the case of contemporary Japan, which has much in common with the United States in 1930-33, it has happened, that the economy still requires monetary stimulus in a situation in which the nominal interest rates under the authorities' direct control have reached zero. If all there was to monetary policy was shifting these rates about, then… it would be easy to be concluded that monetary policy had reached the limits of its powers.
Some economists would agree with this conclusion, but most would argue, to the contrary, that "unconventional" methods such as open-market purchase of long term securities or equities might be worth trying… The express purpose of such methods would, of course, be to increase the quantity of money, in the hope of generating an excess supply thereof, and hence extra expenditure.
And Laidler (2006, pp.157-58) writes that our prevailing theory of monetary policy's focus on interest rates (especially when zero short-term rates are taken to indicate a liquidity trap) has had some odd consequences:
To begin with, a "liquidity trap" is a state of affairs in which the demand for money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to a long rate of interest at some low positive rate of the latter. Until the policy of "quantitative easing" was begun in
2001, the ratio of the Japanese money stock to national income… rose slowly at best and it was short, not long, rates of interest that were essentially zero. Given these facts it is hard to see what the empirical basis for the diagnosis of a liquidity trap could have been. On the other hand, and again before 2001, the empirical evidence gave no reason to reject the hypothesis that a quite separate and distinct phenomenon was at work, namely a Hawtreyan "credit deadlock." Here the problem is not a high elasticity of the economy's demand for money with respect to the long rate of interest, but a low elasticity of its demand for bank credit with respect to the short rate, which is a necessary prerequisite for money creation. The solution to a credit deadlock, as Hawtey pointed out, is vigorous open market operations to bring about increases in the money base and therefore the supply of checkable deposits, that mere manipulation of short term interest rates is usually sufficient to accomplish in less depressed times.
Now the conditions for a liquidity trap might indeed have existed in Japan in the 1990s. Until the credit deadlock affecting its monetary system was broken by quantitative easing in 2001… it was impossible to know this. As it has happened, however, the subsequent up-turn of the Japanese economy that began in 2002 and is still proceeding is beginning to suggest that there was no liquidity trap at work in that economy. If further evidence bears out this conclusion, a serious policy error was made in the 1990s… based on a theory of monetary policy that treats the short interest rate as the central bank's only tool and characterizes the transmission mechanism as working solely through the influence of interest rates on aggregate demand.
That theory provided no means for Japanese policy makers to distinguish between a liquidity trap, which is a possible feature of a demand for money function, and a credit deadlock, which is a characteristic of the money supply process, or for them to entertain the possibility that variations in the money supply might affect aggregate demand by channels over and above any effect on market rates of interest. It was therefore a dangerously defective guide to the conduct of monetary policy in Japan, as it is in any depressed economy.
It is hoped that the present paper has offered some useful qualitative and quantitative evidence germane to David's succinct statement of an important but relatively little researched angle on the causes of long-lasting depression and stagnation in two of the world's largest economies. * For 1986-93 the interest rate refers only to the rate on large deposits over 10 million yen. These are usually about 1 percent above the rate for smaller deposits, but after 1993 there was almost no difference in the rates for different size of deposit.
